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Another year begins with violent conflict in the headlines. For Samuel P. Huntington, the Harvard professor who died last week, this would be further proof for his controversial argument that our global future will be determined by a "clash of civilisations".
Fifteen years ago, in Foreign Affairs, Huntington argued that the phase of history in which we clashed over ideologies had come to a close. In the post-ideological world, cultural identity would become more important in determining friendships within and conflicts between "civilisations".
He defined civilisations as "the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species". He argued a new phase had begun: with the rise of major non-Western states as great powers, the world was becoming genuinely multi-civilisational.
His major target was the complacent belief of many that Western culture, ideas and political and economic systems are becoming universal. The West was declining in influence. The emerging international order would be dominated by six "civilisations": the West, Islam, a Sinic bloc, a Hindu bloc, Latin America, and eastern Orthodox Christianity. He left open the door for a possible seventh, "African" civilisation.
Many of Huntington's ideas were not new, but what made his the most cited, debated and denounced article in Foreign Affairs since the 1940s was its dark vision: that cultural difference leads to conflict. At times, he seemed to almost welcome such conflict as a way to create greater appreciation of the attributes of civilisations. "We know who we are," he wrote, "only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against."
The conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, and the recent India-Pakistan stand-off, could be read as a vindication of his visions of the bloody lines of conflict that trace where civilisations abut.
There was no shortage of people who disagreed. Many argued, justifiably, his concepts of "civilisations" imposed highly simplistic categories on the complexity of world politics. To sweep up in an "Islamic" civilisation the rivalries and hatreds that exist within and between Muslim countries, for example, stretches the model's credibility.
Nor did he offer any reason why cultural commonalities should foster greater co-operation, and cultural differences should provoke conflict. A host of evidence was tendered of exactly the opposite. Other critics were upset by what they saw as the inexorability at the heart of Huntington's vision: civilisations were monolithic and antagonistic, and so conflict inevitable. Such stark visions, it was argued, erode the cosmopolitan understanding needed to negotiate a peaceful future among cultures.
"The Clash of Civilisations" even insinuated its way into Australian domestic politics. In a footnote, Huntington described Australia as a "torn country" whose leaders were trying to take it into a civilisation different from that of most of its citizens. This was seized on by John Howard as a stick to beat Paul Keating as the 1996 election approached. A Coalition government, thundered Howard, would put an end to Keating's "perpetual seminar on Australia's identity" by asserting we were "100 per cent Australian, and always have been".
The age of terrorism ushered in by September 11, 2001, seemed to many to vindicate Huntington. An era of conflict between "the West" and "Islam" seemed to have arrived. The rise of religious fundamentalism and the return of ethnic cleansing seemed to suggest the Harvard don was onto something.
Huntington was right in that our future will be increasingly multi-civilisational. Non-Western great powers will see the world in new ways, and will seek to change it towards their own preferences. There will be less and less on which the world's powers will agree which bodes ill for the negotiation of global solutions to such challenges as climate change. But Huntington was too eager to suggest that greater cultural diversity will lead to greater conflict. Religious and ethnic chauvinism may be on the rise, but there is little evidence conflict is increasingly between "civilisational" blocs. Among the most worrying confrontations are between Russia, Georgia and Ukraine - members of a single "civilisation" by Huntington's reckoning.
Perhaps Huntington's greatest contribution was to call our attention to the growing importance of culture in world politics and the need to understand more about how culture influences the behaviour of states and individuals. It is in this country, which arguably before any other will feel the shift of power among cultures, that we should most seriously take up his challenge.
Michael Wesley is Professor of International Relations at Griffith University and director of the Griffith Asia Institute. More »
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Fifteen years ago, in Foreign Affairs, Huntington argued that the phase of history in which we clashed over ideologies had come to a close. In the post-ideological world, cultural identity would become more important in determining friendships within and conflicts between "civilisations".
He defined civilisations as "the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species". He argued a new phase had begun: with the rise of major non-Western states as great powers, the world was becoming genuinely multi-civilisational.
His major target was the complacent belief of many that Western culture, ideas and political and economic systems are becoming universal. The West was declining in influence. The emerging international order would be dominated by six "civilisations": the West, Islam, a Sinic bloc, a Hindu bloc, Latin America, and eastern Orthodox Christianity. He left open the door for a possible seventh, "African" civilisation.
Many of Huntington's ideas were not new, but what made his the most cited, debated and denounced article in Foreign Affairs since the 1940s was its dark vision: that cultural difference leads to conflict. At times, he seemed to almost welcome such conflict as a way to create greater appreciation of the attributes of civilisations. "We know who we are," he wrote, "only when we know who we are not and often only when we know whom we are against."
The conflict between the Israelis and Palestinians, and the recent India-Pakistan stand-off, could be read as a vindication of his visions of the bloody lines of conflict that trace where civilisations abut.
There was no shortage of people who disagreed. Many argued, justifiably, his concepts of "civilisations" imposed highly simplistic categories on the complexity of world politics. To sweep up in an "Islamic" civilisation the rivalries and hatreds that exist within and between Muslim countries, for example, stretches the model's credibility.
Nor did he offer any reason why cultural commonalities should foster greater co-operation, and cultural differences should provoke conflict. A host of evidence was tendered of exactly the opposite. Other critics were upset by what they saw as the inexorability at the heart of Huntington's vision: civilisations were monolithic and antagonistic, and so conflict inevitable. Such stark visions, it was argued, erode the cosmopolitan understanding needed to negotiate a peaceful future among cultures.
"The Clash of Civilisations" even insinuated its way into Australian domestic politics. In a footnote, Huntington described Australia as a "torn country" whose leaders were trying to take it into a civilisation different from that of most of its citizens. This was seized on by John Howard as a stick to beat Paul Keating as the 1996 election approached. A Coalition government, thundered Howard, would put an end to Keating's "perpetual seminar on Australia's identity" by asserting we were "100 per cent Australian, and always have been".
The age of terrorism ushered in by September 11, 2001, seemed to many to vindicate Huntington. An era of conflict between "the West" and "Islam" seemed to have arrived. The rise of religious fundamentalism and the return of ethnic cleansing seemed to suggest the Harvard don was onto something.
Huntington was right in that our future will be increasingly multi-civilisational. Non-Western great powers will see the world in new ways, and will seek to change it towards their own preferences. There will be less and less on which the world's powers will agree which bodes ill for the negotiation of global solutions to such challenges as climate change. But Huntington was too eager to suggest that greater cultural diversity will lead to greater conflict. Religious and ethnic chauvinism may be on the rise, but there is little evidence conflict is increasingly between "civilisational" blocs. Among the most worrying confrontations are between Russia, Georgia and Ukraine - members of a single "civilisation" by Huntington's reckoning.
Perhaps Huntington's greatest contribution was to call our attention to the growing importance of culture in world politics and the need to understand more about how culture influences the behaviour of states and individuals. It is in this country, which arguably before any other will feel the shift of power among cultures, that we should most seriously take up his challenge.
Michael Wesley is Professor of International Relations at Griffith University and director of the Griffith Asia Institute.">
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