We are told all too often that the invasion of Iraq was the wrong war but that the war in Afghanistan is the right one. Indeed, both presidential candidates favor a surge of troops in Afghanistan. However, the attempt to impose a regime change on Afghanistan is failing, all the while causing more and more Afghan, American, and other casualties.
The main reason is that a conventional army is no match for guerrilla forces, especially when they can rely on a safe haven right across the border. The Taliban dress like civilians, are supplied by civilians, and are housed in civilian homes. When the U.S. attacks them, it inevitably ends up killing civilians, including women and children. The notion that if the U.S. used more ground forces, and less planes and artillery, there would be fewer casualties is a valid one--as far as the Afghans are concerned. But many more Americans and allied troops are going to be lost this way. Using airpower undermines the support of the war by the Afghans; using ground troops undermines the support of the war by America's allies, and soon--by Americans.
Moreover, given that the Pakistani government cannot control the tribal areas that border Afghanistan and which provide a haven for the Taliban, the U.S. is increasingly embroiled in a third war in Pakistan. This engagement is causing still more civilian causalities. It further antagonizes Pakistan, a nation that has nuclear bombs that can be acquired by terrorists, our greatest security nightmare.
The number one lesson from Iraq is that the U.S. must work with local tribes and their militias. In Iraq, this meant working particularly with the Sunnis and the Kurds, but also with various Shia groups. It involved dealing directly with the tribal chiefs or sheiks, and not some elected official in Bagdad. The relative success also entailed allowing the Iraqi forces to carry more of the burden, whether they were fully prepared or not, and granting them various kinds of American help -- in communications, transportation, intelligence, and even fire power - when asked for.
In Afghanistan, the US has been trying to impose a national government and remove tribal chiefs, who command strong and sizable local militias. The time has come to realize that Afghanistan is, even more than Iraq, a tribal society composed of different ethnic groups, each dominating one part of the country. These groups and their troops were the forces that liberated Afghanistan from the Taliban in the first place (remember the Northern Alliance? ). Such tribes are best now called upon to take responsibility for various parts of the country--with American support when asked for.
The result will not be the picture perfect prosperous democracy that Neocons have been dreaming about. It is not in the cards anyhow. Indeed, as it is, the Afghan government is becoming ever more corrupt, increasingly controlled by opium exporting mafias and turning into a new nacro-terrorism state. However, a coalition of the major tribes would go a long way toward stabilizing the country. Casualties would decline, especially among civilians, as it is much easier for the locals to tell who is who. And these tribes will understand that if their country again provides a haven for terrorists, they will face more rounds of bombings and missile attacks. The rest they will have to duke out with each other, as they have been doing since the beginning of history.
All this may seem like a minimalist agenda, but if one recalls the alternatives--especially in terms of the number of killed children and women, as well as some of our own youngsters--one realizes that this is about as good as it is going to get for now.
The main reason is that a conventional army is no match for guerrilla forces, especially when they can rely on a safe haven right across the border. The Taliban dress like civilians, are supplied by civilians, and are housed in civilian homes. When the U.S. attacks them, it inevitably ends up killing civilians, including women and children. The notion that if the U.S. used more ground forces, and less planes and artillery, there would be fewer casualties is a valid one--as far as the Afghans are concerned. But many more Americans and allied troops are going to be lost this way. Using airpower undermines the support of the war by the Afghans; using ground troops undermines the support of the war by America's allies, and soon--by Americans.
Moreover, given that the Pakistani government cannot control the tribal areas that border Afghanistan and which provide a haven for the Taliban, the U.S. is increasingly embroiled in a third war in Pakistan. This engagement is causing still more civilian causalities. It further antagonizes Pakistan, a nation that has nuclear bombs that can be acquired by terrorists, our greatest security nightmare.
The number one lesson from Iraq is that the U.S. must work with local tribes and their militias. In Iraq, this meant working particularly with the Sunnis and the Kurds, but also with various Shia groups. It involved dealing directly with the tribal chiefs or sheiks, and not some elected official in Bagdad. The relative success also entailed allowing the Iraqi forces to carry more of the burden, whether they were fully prepared or not, and granting them various kinds of American help -- in communications, transportation, intelligence, and even fire power - when asked for.
In Afghanistan, the US has been trying to impose a national government and remove tribal chiefs, who command strong and sizable local militias. The time has come to realize that Afghanistan is, even more than Iraq, a tribal society composed of different ethnic groups, each dominating one part of the country. These groups and their troops were the forces that liberated Afghanistan from the Taliban in the first place (remember the Northern Alliance? ). Such tribes are best now called upon to take responsibility for various parts of the country--with American support when asked for.
The result will not be the picture perfect prosperous democracy that Neocons have been dreaming about. It is not in the cards anyhow. Indeed, as it is, the Afghan government is becoming ever more corrupt, increasingly controlled by opium exporting mafias and turning into a new nacro-terrorism state. However, a coalition of the major tribes would go a long way toward stabilizing the country. Casualties would decline, especially among civilians, as it is much easier for the locals to tell who is who. And these tribes will understand that if their country again provides a haven for terrorists, they will face more rounds of bombings and missile attacks. The rest they will have to duke out with each other, as they have been doing since the beginning of history.
All this may seem like a minimalist agenda, but if one recalls the alternatives--especially in terms of the number of killed children and women, as well as some of our own youngsters--one realizes that this is about as good as it is going to get for now.
